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Introduction 
Lemuel Prion contends that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority and 
violated principles of double jeopardy when, 8 months after imposing a sentence of 3 
terms to run concurrently for a maximum term of 15 years, the trial court resentenced 
Mr. Prion to serve those 3 terms consecutively, for a maximum term of 25 years. 
In the opening brief, Mr. Prion argued that the statutory scheme governing the 
sentencing of "guilty and mentally ill" defendants does not authorize trial courts to 
increase an initial sentence based upon information gathered during what section 77-16a-
202(1 )(b) calls "care and treatment" in the state hospital following the imposition of the 
initial sentence. (AOB at 7-13.) Mr. Prion's argument is based on statutory language 
requiring the trial court, in imposing the initial sentence, to exercise its sentencing 
discretion without regard for the defendant's mental illness and to "impose any sentence 
that could be imposed under law upon a defendant who is not mentally ill." (AOB at 8.) 
Under the statute, when a defendant is returned to the district court after "care and 
treatment" at the state hospital, the trial court has a number of options. If the information 
gathered during care and treatment indicates defendant's mental illness should not be 
considered a mitigating factor in the crime for which the original sentence was imposed, 
then the trial court may re-impose the original sentence and order that defendant be 
transferred to prison. But if the information gathered indicates that the mental illness 
should be considered a mitigating factor, or that the mental illness can be treated, e.g., the 
right medication dramatically improves the defendant's condition, then the trial court can 
"resentence" the defendant to reduced prison time or probation. What the trial court 
cannot do is what the trial court did here: impose increased or additional punishment 
based upon information gathered during care and treatment at the state hospital. 
In its response brief, the State argues that the statute permits trial courts to 
resentence a defendant not just to probation or a reduced sentence, but to a harsher 
sentence than initially imposed based upon "information now available through the 
observations and reports from the State Hospital." (Resp. Br. at 17.) In other words, the 
State interprets the statute as authorizing trial courts to impose increased or additional 
punishment for the defendant's mental illness based upon information the State gathers 
under the guise of "care and treatment." Were the State correct, as a practical matter the 
mentally ill would have no incentive to cooperate with their doctors in their "treatment" 
because to do so would be to risk a harsher sentence. As a legal matter, the statute would 
violate the right to jury trial by allowing the enhancement of a sentence based upon facts 
not found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury or admitted by the defendant. 
Mr. Prion also argued in the opening brief that, assuming the statute authorized the 
trial court to increase Mr. Prion's sentence based upon his care and treatment, then his 
second sentence violates constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy. (AOB at 14-21.) 
A number of cases hold that jeopardy attaches once a prisoner begins serving a sentence 
and the government's right to appeal that sentence expires, events that occurred within 30 
days of the imposition of Mr. Prion's initial sentence. (AOB at 14-17.) Mr. Prion also 
argued that were the court of appeals correct that the State could negate double jeopardy 
protections simply by announcing in a statute that sentences are subject to revision, then 
double jeopardy protections would be essentially meaningless. (AOB at 19.) 
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In its response brief, the State cites as the relevant double jeopardy test whether a 
prisoner has a "legitimate expectation in the finality of his sentence/' but ignores factors 
relevant to that expectation, such as the defendant's having begun to serve the sentence 
and the State's having forfeited its right to challenge the sentence on appeal. (Resp. Br. 
at 27-38.) Both of those factors naturally contribute to a defendant's expectation that the 
sentence is final. The State contends that Mr. Prion had no "legitimate expectations" of 
finality in his initial sentence because the statute's language allows resentencing. (Resp. 
Br. at 31-37.) Yet the statute hardly provides notice that a mentally ill person can receive 
increased or additional punishment based upon his care and treatment in the state 
hospital. Unlike a prisoner who violates the terms of his probation and knows that 
violation of those terms may warrant additional punishment, Mr. Prion had no reason to 
expect that his care in the hospital would result in additional punishment. 
In addressing Mr. Prion's argument that the State cannot nullify double jeopardy 
protections simply by enacting a statute that declares all sentences to be subject to 
revision, the State reasons that if the legislature were to enact such a statute, that would 
trigger the "judicial check on legislative enactments." (Resp. Br. at 36.) In other words, 
the courts would declare it unconstitutional. Yet that "judicial check on legislative 
enactments" is precisely what Mr. Prion requests here because the interpretation that the 
State would place on the "guilty and mentally ill" statutory scheme mimics the effect of 
the hypothetical statute that the State concedes would warrant a "judicial check." This 
court should hold that the legislature could not nullify Mr. Prion's double jeopardy 
protections merely by authorizing resentencing. 
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Argument 
Before addressing the trial court's statutory authority to resentence and the 
constitutional limitations on that authority, Mr. Prion first addresses the State's argument 
that a Rule 22(e) motion to correct an illegal sentence is an improper vehicle. We note 
that the State has misleadingly used controlling Utah Supreme Court authority in stating 
the test for an illegal sentence under Rule 22(e). The State argues that the trial court 
(i) lacked statutory authority to increase Mr. Prion's sentence or (ii) violated double 
jeopardy protections by increasing his sentence. (Resp. Br. at 10-12.) In support, the 
State cites State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, 48 P.3d 228, for the proposition that "illegal 
sentence" for purposes of Rule 22(e) 
occurs in one of two situations: (1) where the sentencing 
court has no jurisdiction, or (2) where the sentence is beyond 
the authorized statutory range. 
(Resp. Br. at 11 (emphasis added).) Avoiding a technical violation of the rules of 
professional conduct for failing to cite controlling authority, the State adds a "but see" 
cite to State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, % 11, 232 P.3d 1008, in which the Utah Supreme 
Court rejected the State's narrow reading of Telford. A quote from Candedo will 
illustrate the fine line the State walks in its brief: 
Specifically, the court of appeals determined that an illegal 
sentence can occur only "where either the sentencing court 
has no jurisdiction, or . . . the sentence is beyond the 
authorized statutory range.' [citation]. We disagree." 
Candedo, 2010 UT 32, <[ 10 (first alteration in original) (emphasis added). The court has 
squarely rejected the State's articulated test under Rule 22(e). 
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In fact, Candedo held that illegal sentences include sentences that violate 
constitutional principles. Id at ^ 11. Thus, a Rule 22(e) motion unquestionably is an 
appropriate vehicle to raise Mr. Prion's double jeopardy challenges. 
A Rule 22(e) motion also is an appropriate vehicle to argue that the trial court 
lacked statutory authority to increase Mr. Prion's sentence. In State v. Yazzie, the court 
clarified that a sentence also is illegal if it is "ambiguous with respect to the time and 
manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be 
imposed by statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence which 
the judgment of conviction did not authorize." 2009 UT 14, ^  13, 203 P.3d 984. Thus, a 
wide variety of defects render sentences "illegal" for Rule 22(e) purposes. In Yazzie, the 
court agreed with the State and applied that broad definition of "illegal sentence" to hold 
that the defendant's first sentence was illegal "because it did not comply with the 
statutory requirement to determine concurrent or consecutive sentencing at the time of 
final judgment." Id. j^ 12. After realizing the mistake, the Yazzie trial court imposed a 
second sentence at a later probation revocation hearing where it determined that the 
sentences should run consecutively. Id. fflj 10, 11. Notably for purposes of the issues 
presented here, the only reason Mr. Yazzie's second sentence did not violate principles of 
double jeopardy was that his first sentence was illegal and therefore void. Id. at f^ f 17-18. 
Here, Mr. Prion's first sentence "at the time of final judgment" imposed 3 terms to 
run concurrently. It is undisputed that Mr. Prion's first sentence was not illegal or void. 
In contrast to Mr. Yazzie's second sentence, Mr. Prion's second sentence was illegal 
because, contrary to his legally imposed first sentence, it provided that that Mr. Prion's 
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terms run consecutively. Thus, unlike Mr. Yazzie's second sentence, Mr. Prion's second 
sentence did violate principles of double jeopardy. 
Rule 22(e) is an appropriate vehicle to challenge Mr. Prion's second sentence, 
whether Mr. Prion's position is characterized as the trial court's imposing a sentence 
beyond the range authorized by statute, the trial court's lacking jurisdiction to impose a 
harsher sentence, or the trial court's second sentence violating constitutional prohibitions 
on double jeopardy.1 
I. The Act Does Not Authorize Trial Courts to Impose Harsher Sentences for 
"Care and Treatment" of Mental Illnesses 
The State and Mr. Prion agree that Utah's "guilty and mentally ill" statute permits 
trial courts to enter split sentences consisting of treatment in the state hospital followed 
by time in prison. The State and Mr. Prion also agree that the statute authorizes trial 
courts to resentence prisoners after their treatment in the state hospital. The State and 
Mr. Prion disagree, however, on whether the statute authorizes trial courts to impose 
harsher sentences based upon information gathered during treatment at the state hospital. 
The State contends that reports from the state hospital concerning the prisoner's 
care and treatment function like presentence reports, allowing the trial court to impose a 
harsher sentence "with the benefit of the information now available through observations 
and reports from the State Hospital regarding the accused post-sentencing stay." (Resp. 
1
 The State makes a one-sentence assertion that Mr. Prion's "sentence was legal for 
purposes of rule 22(e), even if a double jeopardy problem existed." (Resp. Br. at 11.) 
Given Candedo's holding that unconstitutional sentences are "illegal" under Rule 22(e), it 
is unclear what the State means by its assertion. Regardless, this court need not address 
i t Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, ^17, 16 P.3d 1233 ("[I]t is well established that a 
reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed."). 
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Br. at 17.) Those reports include clinical facts, diagnosis, course of treatment, prognosis, 
potential for recidivism, dangerousness, and recommended future treatment. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-16a-202(3) (1994). The State concedes that, in imposing a harsher sentence in 
Mr. Prion's case, the trial court gave "great weight" to the reports provided by the state 
hospital during Mr. Prion's "care and treatment." (Resp. Br. at 24.) Unless compelled by 
the plain language of the statute, this court should reject the State's interpretation of the 
statute as authorizing the gathering of sentencing information under the guise of 
cctreatment" and thereby undermining any possibility of treatment by turning doctors into 
unwitting authors of presentence reports. 
The State argues that the plain language of the statute compels this court to 
interpret the statute as turning state hospital reports into presentence reports. The State 
argues that section 77-16a-202(l)(b) allows the trial court to "recall the sentence and 
commitment, and resentence the offender," which must mean the court can enter a new 
sentence not just change the place of commitment from, for example, the state hospital to 
prison or to probation. (Resp. Br. at 16-18.) The State's plain language argument is 
beside the point because it is consistent with how Mr. Prion interpreted the statute. 
Under the statute, the trial court must impose the initial sentence without 
considering mental illness: The trial court "shall impose any sentence that could be 
imposed under law upon a defendant who is not mentally ill and who is convicted of the 
same offense." Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104(3) (1994) (emphasis added). As the State 
puts it, the trial court must "impose a legal sentence upon the defendant as if he were not 
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mentally ill.55 (Resp. Br. at 15.) Here, the trial court followed that mandate by imposing 
a sentence in which the terms ran concurrently. 
After Mr. Prion's "care and treatment55 in the state hospital, the trial court had a 
number of options, some of which involved changing only the place of commitment but 
some of which involved changing the sentence. To the extent the treatment revealed that 
Mr. Prion's mental illness was a mitigating factor, the trial court could have reduced 
Mr. Prion's sentence by taking his mental illness into account when imposing his second 
sentence. The trial court also could have concluded that Mr. Prion would have benefited 
from additional treatment and ordered that he remain in the state hospital until his 
sentence expired, at which time Mr. Prion would have to be released or committed 
civilly. The trial court also could have concluded that the treatment had worked so well 
that probation was appropriate. Finally, the trial court could have concluded that the 
treatment revealed Mr. Prion either was not mentally ill or that his mental illness was not 
a mitigating factor and "resentenced55 him to serve out his original sentence in prison. 
The statute's language, "recall the sentence and commitment,55 is not superfluous 
because the trial court may enter a new sentence if it finds that, in taking the mental 
illness into account in determining the second sentence, a sentence less harsh than one the 
court would impose on someone "who is not mentally ill55 is appropriate. The fact that 
the statute does not authorize the court to impose a harsher sentence in light of the 
prisoner's "care and treatment" for a mental illness does not mean the statute's language 
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authorizing a new "sentence" plays no meaningful role in the statute. A less harsh 
sentence is a new sentence.2 
As demonstrated in the opening brief, Mr. Prion's interpretation not only is 
consistent with the statute's plain language, purpose,3 and legislative history,4 but also is 
consistent with constitutional requirements that any enhancement of a sentence be based 
upon facts found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. The State does not address the 
constitutional concerns because the argument was not preserved in the trial court. (Resp. 
Br. at 25-26.) The State misunderstands Mr. Prion's argument. 
Mr. Prion does not ask this court to declare his second sentence unconstitutional 
because it violates his right to a jury trial. Instead, Mr. Prion asks this court to follow its 
long-standing cannon of statutory interpretation to interpret statutes in a constitutional 
2
 The State argues that flexibility in sentencing is needed because "the effectiveness of 
the mental health treatment provided under section 77-16a-202(l)(b) cannot be 
predicted." (Resp. Br. at 19.) But that concern explains only why trial courts must 
disregard any mental illness when imposing the initial sentence. Otherwise, an inmate's 
treatment at the mental hospital becomes a search for new information upon which to 
increase his sentence. Nowhere in the law is mental illness an aggravating factor. 
The State concedes that the statute's purpose is to provide "a compassionate alternative 
by which convicted offenders, who were mentally ill at the time of their crime, receive 
special hospitalization and treatment if they remain mentally ill at the time of 
resentencing." (Resp. Br. at 18-19.) 
4
 Representative Lloyd Frandsen, the sponsor, described the bill as providing an 
administrative process aimed at "maximizing the treatment potential for mentally ill 
offenders." 1992 HB 418, House Floor Debate, Feb. 25, 1992, available at 
http:/www.le.state.ut.us/asp/audio/index.asp?House^H. (AOB at Add. F.) Several 
agencies, including the Department of Human Services and the Department of 
Corrections, collaborated on the bill in an effort to address the needs of this unique class 
of convicted persons. Id. Representative Frandsen described the period of confinement 
as "treatment," which would be followed by a possible modification of the prisoner's 
sentence. Id, Neither the debate nor the House research file indicates that the treatment 
was a vehicle to gather information akin to a presentence report. 
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manner whenever possible. In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988) 
(sua sponte interpreting a statute "in accordance with the requirements of several federal 
and state constitutional provisions which provide the basis for a sensible interpretation ... 
and allow us to give it practical effect"). The issue that required preservation is that the 
statute does not authorize trial courts to increase sentences based upon a mentally ill 
person's "care and treatment" at the state hospital. That issue was preserved5 (GR. 54-
55) and falls within the scope of this court's certiorari jurisdiction.6 This court may 
consider the constitutional implications of its interpretation of the "guilty and mentally 
ill" statute. 
Enhancing a mentally ill person's original sentence with information gathered 
during his treatment at the state hospital, where the facts are not found beyond a 
reasonable doubt by a jury, violates the right to jury trial under the Utah Constitution. 
The Utah Constitution requires that all punishment-enhancing facts must be established 
beyond a reasonable doubt either by a defendant's plea or by a jury trial. State v. Lopes, 
5
 Any ambiguity concerning whether Mr. Prion's pro se papers preserved an issue should 
be resolved in Mr. Prion's favor. Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, ffif 3-4, 67 P.3d 1000. 
("[BJecause of his lack of technical knowledge of law and procedure a layman acting as 
his own attorney should be accorded every consideration that may reasonably be 
indulged."). 
6
 Certiorari was granted to consider "whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the 
denial of Petitioner's rule 22(e) challenge to his re-sentencing." Order Granting 
Certiorari, Jan. 20, 2010. "Questions presented for review within the petition for 
certiorari 'will be deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly included therein.'" 
State v. Leber, 2009 UT 59, Tf 10, 216 P.3d 964 (citing Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4)). "[T]his 
rule should be construed broadly to avoid the rigid exclusion of reviewable issues, 
however peripheral." Id. 
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1999 UT 24, f 22, 980 P.2d 191. Otherwise, a judge's independent fact finding for 
sentencing violates a defendant's due process and jury trial rights. Id. 
This court should hold that the trial court lacked statutory authority to impose a 
harsher sentence after, and based upon, Mr. Prion's care and treatment in the state 
hospital. The statute was not designed to undermine a mentally ill person's treatment by 
turning doctors at the state hospital into the authors of presentence reports used by trial 
courts to impose increased or additional punishment. This court should vacate 
Mr. Prion's second sentence and reinstate his first sentence of 3 concurrent terms with a 
15 year maximum. 
II. Mr. Prion's Second Sentence Violates Principles of Double Jeopardy 
The trial court's second sentence, increasing Mr. Prion's maximum term from 
15 years to 25 years, also violates constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy. The 
State's entire argument on this point is that Mr. Prion had no "legitimate expectation of 
finality" in his first sentence because the statute expressly authorized the trial court to 
resentence Mr. Prion. (Resp. Br. at 27-37.) The State is incorrect. 
A. "A Legitimate Expectation of Finality" Cannot Be Undermined by a 
Statute Declaring Any Sentence Is Subject to Revision 
As an initial matter, it is worth pausing to appreciate the implications of the State's 
argument that as long as the statute states a sentence can be revisited, then jeopardy does 
not attach because the prisoner has no "legitimate expectation of finality" in the original 
sentence. Were that correct, then the Utah Legislature could enact a statute expressly 
stating that any criminal sentence is subject to revision, even after the sentence has been 
served. But the legislature's declaring all sentences subject to revision can no more 
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negate a prisoner's legitimate expectation of finality for double jeopardy purposes than a 
police department's declaring all citizens will be subject to illegal searches can negate a 
citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy for search and seizure purposes. 
At times, the State recognizes the problem with its position, but responds only by 
stating that if such a statute were enacted it would be subject to "the judicial check on 
legislative enactments," presumably referring to judicial authority to declare statutes 
unconstitutional. (Resp. Br. at 36.) But a "judicial check on legislative enactments" is 
precisely what Mr. Prion seeks here. If the trial court correctly interpreted the "guilty and 
mentally ill" statute as providing it authority to impose a harsher sentence after, and 
based upon, Mr. Prion's care and treatment in the state hospital, then the statute violates 
constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy. 
To be clear, Mr. Prion does not argue that a statutory authorization to resentence 
an offender is irrelevant to double jeopardy analysis, but instead argues that a mere 
authorization to resentence cannot negate double jeopardy protections. The cases cited 
by the State illustrate the difference. A prisoner does not have a legitimate expectation of 
finality in an original sentence where a statute authorizes the government to take a timely 
appeal challenging the original sentence as too lenient. United States v. DiFrancesco, 
449 U.S. 117, 134 (1980) ("the common law never ascribed such finality to a sentence as 
would prevent a legislative body from authorizing its appeal by the prosecution"). A 
prisoner also does not have a legitimate expectation that his original sentence will not be 
reinstated if he violates the terms of his probation. Thomas v. United States, 327 F.2d 
795, 797 (10th Cir. 1964) (no double jeopardy violation after probation violation to 
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"require appellant to serve any part or all of the original sentence5'). And a prisoner has 
no legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence that is expressly subject to revision if 
the prisoner violates the terms of probation or an equivalent "community corrections 
program.55 Romero v. People, 179 P.3d 984, 988 (Colo. 2007) (en banc) (increasing a 
sentence based upon "relapse to cocaine55); State v. Gefroh, 458 N.W.2d 479, 483 (N.D. 
1990) (increasing sentence based upon violation of terms of probation). 
At best, those cases stand for the proposition that where a defendant is given a 
reduced sentence conditioned upon his complying with the terms of probation, it does not 
violate double jeopardy for the prisoner to be resentenced to a harsher sentence if he 
violates the terms of probation. Where the prisoner has committed an additional wrong, 
and is expressly told that his committing an additional wrong may result in increased (or 
additional) punishment, there is no "legitimate expectation of finality55 in the original 
sentence when he later, in fact, commits the additional wrong. 
Contrast those circumstances with the circumstances here. In imposing 
Mr. Prion's original sentence, the trial court did not impose a reduced sentence based 
upon his mental illness, but instead, as the State puts it, imposed "a sentence upon the 
defendant as if he were not mentally ill.55 (Resp. Br. at 15.) Mr. Prion was not released 
7
 The State cites Sentence Review Panel v. Moselev, 663 S.E.2d 679, 683-84 (Ga. 2008), 
for the following proposition: "where statute provided for modification of sentence after 
imposition, sentence was not final, no expectation of finality arose, and double jeopardy 
did not preclude subsequent increase in sentence.55 (Resp. Br. at 30.) In Moseley, the 
Georgia Supreme Court held that reinstating a 15-year sentence, after a quasi-legislative 
review panel reduced the sentence to 8 years, did violate double jeopardy protections, 
even though the statute authorizing the quasi-legislative panel to review sentences was 
later declared unconstitutional. Moseley, 663 S.E.2d at 683-85. The State's 
characterization is difficult to square with the holding in Moseley. 
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on probation with a clear directive that, if he violated the terms of his release, then his 
sentence would be increased or additional punishment imposed. Instead, Mr. Prion 
received "care and treatment" in the state hospital for his mental illness where he 
committed no additional bad act for which he received additional punishment. The state 
hospital merely provided treatment and care of a mental illness. If the possibility of 
resentencing under the circumstances here extinguishes any "legitimate expectation of 
finality" for double jeopardy purposes, then any legislative statement that sentences are 
subject to revision will nullify double jeopardy protections—an absurd result. This court 
should reject the State's position and hold that the trial court's second sentence violates 
double jeopardy protections. 
B. Indicia of Finality Include Entry of a Legal Sentence, Commencement 
of Service, and Forfeiture of Appellate Rights 
Instead of looking only to whether the statute permits resentencing, this court 
should consider all indicia of finality in the double jeopardy context. Other indicia 
include: (i) entry of a legal sentence, (ii) beginning to serve a sentence; and (iii) the 
government's forfeiture of appellate rights to challenge a sentence. (AOB at 14-19.) 
Each of these events provides an inmate reason to expect finality in his sentence. 
First, entry of a legal sentence is an indicium of finality. A defendant can acquire 
no legitimate expectation of finality if the sentence is illegal. United States v. Jackson, 
903 F.2d 1313, 1316 (10th Cir. 1990). The State does not suggest that Mr. Prion's 
original sentence was illegal or question its entry. 
Second, commencing service of a sentence indicates finality. When the defendant 
begins serving a legal sentence, the court can no longer recall it and impose more 
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punishment. Combs v. Turner, 483 P.2d 437, 439-41 (Utah 1971). Rather, after a 
defendant commences serving a legal sentence, the sentence is final for double jeopardy 
purposes. Borum v. United States, 409 F.2d 433,440-41 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (finding a 
double jeopardy violation where trial judge called defendant back to court five days after 
sentencing to clarify that the sentences were to run consecutively instead of 
concurrently.); see also United States v. Davidson, 597 F.2d 230, 232 (10th Cir. 1979) 
(permitting recall and modification of sentence only because, in the one and one-half 
hours after sentencing, defendant had not yet been released to custody to begin serving 
his sentence.) Where a valid sentence is imposed and the defendant has begun to serve 
that sentence, the defendant can legitimately expect that the sentence is final. 
Importantly, here the State does not dispute that Mr. Prion was serving his sentence 
o 
during his 8 months at the state hospital. 
Third, an inmate should expect that his sentence is final if neither party appeals. 
Where the government appeals the sentence, there is no legitimate "expectation of 
finality." United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136(1980). But if the government 
forfeits its right to appeal by failing to file a timely notice of appeal, the inmate does 
develop a legitimate expectation of finality. Id. Similarly, where in inmate disturbs the 
original sentence with a successful appeal, had has no legitimate expectation of finality. 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 721 (1969); State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, 
o 
Consistent with this position, under section 77-16a-202(4), once the time a prisoner has 
spent confined in the state hospital equals the maximum term reflected in the sentence 
imposed by the court, the prisoner can remain confined only pursuant to the separate civil 
commitment statutes. In addition, under section 77-16a-205, a prisoner can become 
eligible for, and be granted, parole while confined to the state hospital. 
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T[ 3, 975 P.2d 476. Here, the State could have appealed Mr. Prion's original sentence for 
30 days after it was imposed, as this court has recognized similar "split" sentencing 
orders as final for purposes of appeal. State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, ^ 16, 993 P.2d 854. 
Once the time to challenge Mr. Prion's original sentence expired, he had a legitimate 
expectation of finality, at least with regard to his original sentence not becoming harsher 
based upon his care and treatment for his mental illness in the state hospital. 
Along with those indicia of finality, the "guilty and mentally ill" statute supplied 
Mr. Prion with the legitimate expectation that his original sentence would not be 
increased. The trial court's later increasing it violated principles of double jeopardy. 
This court should vacate Mr. Prion's second sentence and reinstate his first sentence. 
Conclusion 
This court has jurisdiction to consider Mr. Prion's challenge to his sentence in an 
appeal from the denial of a Rule 22(e) motion to correct illegal sentence. This court 
should vacate Mr. Prion's second sentence and reinstate the original sentence on two 
separate grounds. First, the district court exceeded its statutory authority by increasing 
the original sentence under section 77-16a-202(b). Second, even if the district court had 
statutory authority, its exercise of that authority violated double jeopardy provisions in 
both the Utah Constitution and the United States Constitution. This court should reverse. 
DATED this 24th day of January, 2011. 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
Troy L. Itafoher 
Attorneys for Petitioner Lemuel Prion 
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